Toward a Systematic Approach to the Economic Effects of Risk: Characterizing Utility Functions" by Gollier, Christian & Kimball, Miles S.
 18‐909	
	
	
	
“Toward	a	Systematic	Approach	to	the	Economic	Effects	of	
Risk:	Characterizing	Utility	Functions"		
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Christian	GOLLIER	and	Miles	S.	KIMBALL	
April	2018	
Toward a Systematic Approach to the Economic
Effects of Risk: Characterizing Utility Functions
Christian GOLLIER
Toulouse School of Economics
Miles S. KIMBALL
University of Colorado Boulder
March 27, 2018
Abstract
The Diffidence Theorem, together with complementary tools, can
aid in illuminating a broad set of questions about how to mathemat-
ically characterize the set of utility functions with specified economic
properties. This paper establishes the technique and illustrates its ap-
plication to many questions, old and new. For example, among many
other older and other technically more difficult results, it is shown that
(1) several implications of globally greater risk aversion depend on dis-
tinct mathematical properties when the initial wealth level is known,
(2) whether opening up a new asset market increases or decreases sav-
ing depends on whether the reciprocal of marginal utility is concave or
convex, and (3) whether opening up a new asset market raises or low-
ers risk aversion towards small independent risks depends on whether
absolute risk aversion is convex or concave.
Acknowledgement: We would also like to acknowledge funding from the chair
SCOR and FDIR at TSE.
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1 Introduction
By implying linearity of preferences in probabilities, von Neumann-Morgenstern
expected utility theory provides a great deal of common structure for applied
problems. Yet the literature on the economics of risk has often approached
each applied problem or small class of applied problems in what look like
very different ways. In this paper, we endeavor to make a bare beginning
to systematizing approaches to applied problems in the economics of risk.
In particular, we study a systematic technique for approaching the mathe-
matical characterization of sets of utility functions with particular economic
properties. That is, the objective here is to build a path between economic
properties of preferences and mathematical properties of utility functions.
In a companion paper, ”New Methods in the Classical Economics of Un-
certainty: Comparing Risks” (Gollier and Kimball, 2018), we address the
mathematical characterization of risks that have particular economic prop-
erties in relation to specified sets of utility functions.
A spur for the development of more systematic techniques in the eco-
nomics of risk is the burgeoning and technically difficult literature on back-
ground risks. Since Doherty and Schlesinger (1983), Ross (1981), Kihlstrom,
Romer and Williams (1981) and Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987), our under-
standing of the behavior of agents facing more than one source of risk has
made a great deal of progress. A common feature of analyses of the inter-
action between independent risks is the existence of paradoxes that can be
solved by putting additional restrictions on the utility function. For exam-
ple, Kimball (1993), Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger (1996), and Gollier
and Pratt (1996) showed conditions under which adding a nonmarketable
zero-mean risk to wealth can induce a risk-averse agent to purchase more of
another independent risky asset. Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) pushed
this literature further.
Difficult background risk problems and more basic problems in the eco-
nomics of risk often share elements with the same technical structure. More
than twenty years ago, we wrote an early version of this paper (Gollier
and Kimball, 1994) in which we provided a simple method for solving these
problems. The centerpiece of this method is the ”Diffidence Theorem.” This
theorem has since been used by various authors to solve some of these com-
plex problems in a simple way, as we show in examples throughout this
paper.
In addition to illustrating a technique of wide applicability, reframing
many existing results in useful ways, and establishing many minor new re-
sults, we establish at least three important substantive results not in the
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previous literature. First, we clarify the ways in which globally greater risk
aversion can be overkill for an applied problem. If something is known about
initial starting wealth, the much weaker condition of centrally greater risk
aversion or the even weaker condition of centrally greater diffidence will of-
ten be enough. This leads to a much deeper understanding of Arrow-Pratt
theory. The mathematics is so basic, it is often tucked, in some form, some-
where into proofs in previous papers, but has not been explored fully in its
own right. Second, we give a mathematical characterization of the set of
utility functions for which opening up a new asset market would lead to less
saving, and the antiphonal set of utility functions for which opening up a
new asset market would lead to more saving. Third, we characterize the set
of utility functions for which opening up a new asset market would make
an agent more risk averse toward a small risk independent of the risk in the
new asset market.
Let us turn now to the Diffidence Theorem itself. In many instances, the
comparative statics problem involving risk can be written in the following
form: Under what conditions on functions f1 and f2 can we guarantee that
∀x˜ : Ef1(x˜) ≤ Ef1(x0) =⇒ Ef2(x˜) ≤ Ef2(x0), (1)
for some starting wealth w. Let us consider a very simple illustration of
problem (1). There are several ways to define the concept of ”greater risk
aversion”. For example, one can stipulate the definition that an agent with
utility function u2 is more risk-averse than another with utility function u1
if and only if any risk x˜ that is rejected by the latter is also rejected by the
former, independent of the sure common wealth level w of the two agents.
This is an application of problem (1) with fi(x) = ui(w+x) For each initial
wealth level, this problem is equivalent to the following property:
∀x˜ : Eu1(w + x˜) ≤ u1(x0) =⇒ Eu2(w + x˜) ≤ u2(x0), (2)
The concepts of risk aversion, prudence, temperance, decreasing absolute
risk aversion, decreasing absolute prudence, proper risk aversion(Pratt and
Zeckhauser, 1987), risk vulnerability (Gollier and Pratt, 1996; Gollier 2001),
and standard risk aversion (Kimball, 1993) can also be defined by using defi-
nition (1) for some specific pair of functions (f1, f2), or by using its bivariate
extension that we also present in this paper. In addition, we consider new
concepts having the same structure as in (1). For example, under what
condition does an increase in nonmarketable background risk raise the equi-
librium risk free rate in the economy? Or, under what condition does open-
ing up a new asset market raise current consumption? And does opening
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a market for a new asset reduce the demand for another independent risky
asset? All these questions, and others, are solved in this paper by using the
Diffidence Theorem.
The Diffidence Theorem is a consequence of the linearity of expected
utility with respect to probabilities. This linearity implies that Condition
(1) holds for all random variables if and only if it holds for all binary random
variables. This property singularly simplifies the structure of the problem,
and the Diffidence Theorem can be seen as an application of that result.
Property (1) is related to the condition that f2 is more concave that
f1 in the sense of Arrow-Pratt. This is an obvious consequence of Jensen’s
inequality, a ubiquitous tool in decision theory under uncertainty. However,
the ”more concave” condition is often too restrictive, and the Diffidence
Theorem provides the right necessary and sufficient condition for property
(1). For example, when considering problem (2) for a given wealth level
w, it is easy to show that there exist pairs of functions (u1, u2) for which
u2 is not more risk-averse than u1 in the sense of Arrow-Pratt, but still u2
rejects all lotteries that u1 rejects. By using the Diffidence Theorem, we
easily characterize the notion of ”centrally greater diffidence,” which is the
weakest condition on (u1, u2) that guarantees (2), and lends the Diffidence
Theorem its name because it is the most straightforward application of the
theorem. Of course, because this property must hold for small risks, a
necessary condition for centrally greater diffidence is that −u′′2(x0)/u′2(x0)
be larger than −u′′(x0)/u′1(x0), but this condition need not hold at other
wealth levels.
One of the beauties of the celebrated paper by Pratt (1964) is to show
that a condition ”in the small” – that is, for small risks – if required to hold
at all wealth levels, is sufficient ”in the large”, that is, for any risk. For
example, if individual 2 dislikes all small risks that individual 1 dislikes, and
if this is true at all common wealth levels, then it is known that individual
2 also dislikes any risk that individual 1 dislikes. Such a result is not true in
general under the structure (1), except in some special cases that we identify
in this paper.
In Section 2, we prove the Diffidence Theorem and its Corollary. We
illustrate the use of the Diffidence Theorem by presenting many applications
in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to the bivariate Diffidence Theorem and
its applications. Other extensions are considered in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.
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2 The Diffidence Theorem
In this section, we characterize the set of real-valued functions f2 that satisfy
condition (1) for a given real-valued function f1 and a given value of starting
wealth w.1 The proof of the Diffidence Theorem relies on the following
Lemma.2
Lemma 1 Condition (1) is satisfied for any distribution of x˜ if and only
if it is satisfied (a) for all one-point distributions, and (b) for all two-point
distributions that satisfy condition Ef1(x˜) ≤ Ef1(x0) as an equality.
Proof: Necessity is obvious. To see sufficiency, note that Condition (1) is
equivalent to
max
x˜
Ef2(x˜)− Ef2(x0) ≤ 0 (3)
s.t. Ef1(x˜)− Ef1(x0) ≤ 0.
Both the objective function and the constraint of this problem are linear in
probabilities. Thus it is a linear programming problem on the unit simplex.
If the region in which the constraint is not violated is nonempty, the max-
imum value of the objective must be achieved on one of the vertices of the
multidimensional polyhedron formed by slicing off the portion of the unit
simplex that violates the constraint. These vertices represent two types of
random variables: (a) degenerate distributions with all of the mass on one
value of x, and (b) two-point distributions that satisfy the constraint with
equality.
This result is related to the well-established fact that condition Ef2(x˜) ≤
Ef2(x0) holds for any x˜ if and only if it holds for any degenerate (one-point)
random variable. Introducing a condition on x˜, in particular that x˜ must
satisfy Ef1(x˜) ≤ Ef1(x0), makes it necessary to consider not only degenerate
random variables, but also all two-point random variables.
The Diffidence Theorem is a consequence of Lemma 1. To escape trivi-
ality, assume that there exists at least one x ∈ R such that f1(x) ≤ Ef1(x0).
1It is easy to check that x0 can be replaced with a reference random variable ω˜ without
affecting the proof of the Diffidence Theorem, but the key applications we have in mind
in this paper have a nonstochastic initial wealth. Replacing x0 with ω˜ would, however,
affect the proof of Corollary 1 below.
2The proof of Theorem 3 in Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987) is based on the same basic
idea.
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Theorem 1 (Diffidence Theorem) Condition (1) for any random variable
x˜ with support in [a, b] is equivalent to the condition that there exists an
m ∈ R+ ∪ {+∞} such that
∀x ∈ [a, b] : f2(x)− Ef2(x0) ≤ m[f1(x)− Ef1(x0)]. (4)
Proof: Notice first that the sufficiency of (4) is obvious. Turning to neces-
sity, if f1 reaches a global maximum at x0, then the ”if” clause in Condition
(1) is true for any random variable, Ef2(x˜) ≤ Ef2(x0) must hold for any x˜
and Condition (4) holds with m = 0. If f1 reaches a global minimum at x0,
then Condition (4) holds with m = +∞. (Wherever f1(x)−f1(x0) = 0, Con-
dition (1) for degenerate risks implies f2(x)−f(x0) ≤ 0. Elsewhere, any pos-
sible value of f2(x)− f2(x0), satisfies f2(x)− f2(x0) ≤ +∞(f1(x)− f1(x0)).)
For necessity when f1 is neither a global minimum nor a global maximum
at w, let φ1 and φ2 denote Ef1(x0) and Ef2(x0), respectively. By the com-
pactness of the simplex and the nontriviality assumption, a solution exists
to program (3). So, considering two-point risks, we know that Condition (1)
implies that ∀x1, x2 ∈ [a, b],∀p ∈ [0, 1] :
pf1(x1) + (1− p)f1(x2) = φ1 =⇒ pf2(x1) + (1− p)f2(x2) ≤ φ2. (5)
Consider an x1 for which f(x1) 6= f(x0). Suppose without loss of generality
that f1(x1) < φ1 and f1(x2) > φ1. The first condition in (5) is equivalent to
p =
φ1 − f1(x2)
f1(x1)− f1(x2) .
Substituting p in the second condition of (5) makes it equivalent to
(φ1 − f1(x2))(f2(x1)− φ2) ≥ (φ1 − f1(x1))(f2(x2)− φ2),
for any x1 and x2 in [a, b] such that f1(x1) < φ1 and f1(x2) > φ1. The above
inequality is itself equivalent to
f2(x2)− φ2
f1(x2)− φ1 ≤ m ≤
f2(x1)− φ2
f1(x1)− φ1 , (6)
for some real number m and for any x1 and x2 in [a, b] such that f1(x1) < φ1
and f1(x2) > φ1. This is in turn equivalent to Condition (4) without the sign
condition on m (and we dealt above with the only case in which m = +∞ is
needed). The condition m ≥ 0 is required to guarantee that Condition (4)
is satisfied for all one-point random variables.
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It is noteworthy that Condition (4), with m positive or negative, forces
Condition (1) to hold for all two-point random variables x˜ that satisfy condi-
tion Ef1(x˜) ≤ Ef1(x0) as an equality. The other condition – m nonnegative
– forces condition (1) for all degenerate (one-point) random variables. It
is thus easy to verify that if the first inequality in (1) is replaced by an
equality, the conclusion for necessity is the same except that m can be any
real number.3 The arguments above still apply, except in the case when f1
reaches a maximum at x0. In that case, m = −∞ works. Thus, if Condition
(1) is replaced by
∀x˜ : Ef1(x˜) = Ef1(x0) =⇒ Ef2(x˜) ≤ Ef2(x0), (7)
the Diffidence Theorem for the case of an equality antecedent states that
there exists an m ∈ R ∪ {+∞} ∪ {−∞}
∀x ∈ [a, b] : f2(x)− Ef2(x0) ≤ m[f1(x)− Ef1(x0)]. (8)
The marginal product of the Diffidence Theorem relative to the Lemma
is that given the Diffidence Theorem, one only has to verify a unidimensional
condition. But the cost is the necessity of looking for an m that satisfies
it. An important additional simplification can be obtained if f1 and f2 are
differentiable at x0, and f
′
1(x0) 6= 0. In that case there is a unique candidate
for m identified in the following Corollary.
Corollary 1 If f ′1(x0) 6= 0 and f ′2(x0) exists, the unique candidate for m in
(4) is
m =
f ′2(x0)
f ′1(x0)
. (9)
If f1 and f2 are twice differentiable at w, a necessary condition for (1) is
f ′′2 (x0) ≤
f ′2(x0)
f ′1(x0)
f ′′1 (x0). (10)
Proof: Condition (4) means that function ξ(x) must be nonpositive, with
ξ(x) = f2(x)− f2(x0)−m[f1(x)− f1(x0)].
But ξ(x0) = 0, so the global maximum of ξ must be at w. The necessary
condition for a maximum must hold: f ′2(x0)−mf ′1(x0) = 0, yielding the first
3Also, the change of the direction of the first and/or the second inequality in (1) can
easily be considered by replacing fi with −fi
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 x 
(x)
x0=0
Figure 1: Local Diffidence Conditions: If ξ(x) must be non-positive every-
where, and if ξ(x0) is zero, then ξ
′(x0) must be zero and ξ′′(x0) must be
non-positive. These local necessary conditions are generally not sufficient
for ξ to be non-positive everywhere.
result. Condition (10) is a direct consequence of the second-order condition
ξ′′(x0) ≤ 0. This concludes the proof, whose basic idea is described in Figure
1.
Remark: If f ′1(x0) = 0, then f ′2(x0) −mf ′1(x0) = 0 implies that f ′2(x0) = 0
as well. But then any m satisfies f ′2(x0) − mf ′1(x0) = 0, so the Corollary
provides no guidance for the value of m when f ′1(x0) = 0.
Because m has to be nonnegative, Condition (9) indicates that f ′1(x0)
and f ′2(x0) must have the same sign. In fact, this is a ”local” necessary
condition guaranteeing that property (1) holds for all degenerate random
variables close to w. Notice also that necessary condition (10) is necessary
and sufficient for (1) to hold for any small risk whose support is in the
neighborhood of w.
In general, the problem faced by researchers is a bit more complicated
than (1). More specifically, functions fi may depend upon a parameter (or
parameter vector) w, leading to the problem
∀x˜ : EF1(w, x˜) ≤ F1(w, x0) =⇒ EF2(w, x˜) ≤ F2(w, x0). (11)
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For most of the applications below, w is a scalar that can be interpreted
as initial wealth. When allowing for a parameter or parameter vector w,
it is usually convenient to focus on functions for which x0 = 0: fi(w, x) =
Fi(w, x− x0). Then the condition above becomes
∀x˜ : Ef1(w, x˜) ≤ f1(w, 0) =⇒ Ef2(w, x˜) ≤ f2(w, 0). (12)
A direct extension of the Diffidence Theorem is that condition (12) has
the following necessary and sufficient condition
∀x ∈ [a, b] : f2(w, x)− f2(w, 0) ≤
∂f2
∂x (w, 0)
∂f1
∂x (w, 0)
[f1(w, x)− f1(w, 0)]. (13)
We refer to this condition as the ”central” necessary and sufficient condition
associated with parameter w. Closely connected to this condition are two
”local” necessary conditions:
∂f2
∂x (w, 0)
∂f1
∂x (w, 0)
≥ 0, (14)
and
∂2f2
∂x2
(w, 0) ≤
∂f2
∂x (w, 0)
∂f1
∂x (w, 0)
∂2f1
∂x2
(w, 0). (15)
When property (12) is required to hold for all values of the parameter w,
Condition (13) becomes the global necessary and sufficient condition. This
global necessary and sufficient condition (13) may be complex to verify. It
requires that a bivariate function be uniformly nonpositive.
In order to study the global necessary and sufficient condition (13) and
necessary conditions (14) and (15), from here on in the paper, we will assume
that f1 and f2 are twice differentiable, unless stated otherwise. If f1 or f2
might not be differentiable, one must return to the Diffidence Theorem itself,
with less guidance about the values of m that will work for each 0. If f1 and
f2 can be assumed to be differentiable, but may not be twice differentiable,
Condition (15) must be replaced by a statement that
f2(x)−
∂f2
∂x (w, 0)
∂f1
∂x (w, 0)
f1(x) (16)
is locally concave in the neighborhood of w.
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3 Applications of the Diffidence Theorem
There are examples of problems of type (12) for which the combination of
the univariate necessary conditions (14) and (15) is sufficient. This leads to
a characterization of the solution that is simpler than the bivariate charac-
terization (13). These examples are gathered in the first part of this section.
3.1 Applications with a univariate necessary and sufficient
condition
The celebrated results of Pratt (1964) are directly relevant to applications
of the Diffidence Theorem in which the functions fi(w, x) take the additive
form gi(w + x), i.e., when w and x are perfect substitutes. For these cases,
we obtain the following result, a restatement of the main result of Pratt
(1964).
Proposition 1 The following two conditions are equivalent:
1. For all w and for all x˜ such that the support of w + x˜ is in the joint
domain of (g1, g2),
Eg1(w + x˜) ≤ g1(x0) =⇒ Eg2(w + x˜) ≤ g2(w). (17)
2. Function ϕ is increasing and concave, where ϕ is such that ϕ(g1(t)) =
g2(t) for all t in the joint domain of (g1, g2).
The property that ϕ is an increasing function is equivalent to the nec-
essary condition (14) in this additive case. Similarly, given the twice-
differentiability we have assumed, the condition that ϕ is concave is equiv-
alent to Condition (15), which can be rewritten as:
∀w : g′′2(w) ≤
g′2(w)
g′1(w)
g′′1(w). (18)
This shows that in this additive case, the Diffidence Theorem, when
applied at all wealth levels, simplifies to the classical condition that g2 be
more concave than g1 in the sense of Arrow-Pratt. As explained by Pratt
[1964], the necessary and sufficient condition ”in the small” obtained from
comparing the indices of absolute concavity −g′′i /g′i is also necessary and
sufficient ”in the large”.
It is easy to show that when the first inequality in condition (17) is
replaced by an equality, the necessary and sufficient condition simplifies to
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ϕ being concave. The monotonicity of ϕ is not required in that case. In the
next subsections, we show what the Diffidence Theorem adds to Arrow-Pratt
theory.
3.1.1 Central diffidence, central risk aversion and global risk aver-
sion
Probably the simplest application of the Diffidence Theorem is the charac-
terization of “diffidence” itself. An agent is centrally diffident around w if
and only if:
∀x˜ Ex˜ = 0 =⇒ Eu(w + x˜) ≤ u(w), (19)
for all x˜ and a particular w. That is, an agent is centrally diffident around
w if the agent would reject any mean zero risk added to that initial wealth
level w. An agent is globally diffident if this holds for all w. Assuming differ-
entiability of u, the necessary and sufficient condition for central diffidence
around w is that for some real number m,
u(w + x)− u(w) ≤ mx (20)
(Note that the function x has no global maximum or minimum.) Because
Ex˜ = 0 is an equation rather than an inequality, there is no restriction on
the sign of m. If u is differentiable, m = u′(w) and the condition for central
diffidence around w becomes
∀x u(w + x)− u(w) ≤ u′(w)x (21)
The power of the method here is that the universal quantifier ∀x in (21)
is a quantifier only over all real numbers x, not over all distributions x˜.
Geometrically, this condition says that the utility function lies below its
tangent line at w. This has the local necessary condition u′′(x) ≤ 0, as
illustrated in Figure 2. Thus, if central diffidence holds for all possible initial
wealth levels w, then the utility function must be concave and therefore
exhibits global risk aversion in the usual sense.
We define central risk aversion around w by the stronger property that
an agent always wants less in absolute value of the amount α of a mean-zero
risk in a portfolio problem. Since ∂∂αEu(w+αx˜) = Ex˜u
′(w+ x˜), saying that
this derivative with respect to α has the opposite sign from α itself when
x˜ = 0 can be written
∀x˜ Ex˜ = 0 =⇒ αEx˜u′(w + αx˜) ≤ 0. (22)
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 w+x 
u(w+x) 
w 
u(w)+xu’(w) 
Figure 2: An example of a utility function u that is central diffident around
wealth level w, but is not concave. Concavity is necessary only locally
around w.
The powerful universal quantifier over all distributions x˜ allows one to nor-
malize α to unity. Thus, central risk aversion around w has the necessary
and sufficient condition
∀x xu′(w + x) ≤ xu′(w) (23)
Marginal utility is lower than to the right of w than at w and higher to the
left of w than at w, as is illustrated in Figure 3. This also has the local
necessary condition u′′(x) ≤ 0. Thus, if central risk aversion holds for all
possible initial wealth levels w it also implies concavity and therefore global
risk aversion in the usual sense.
How are central diffidence and central risk aversion related to one an-
other when they hold only for a particular initial wealth w? First, if the
initial wealth level is known, these are very useful properties for applica-
tions. Global risk aversion is often stronger than necessary. To guarantee
that an agent will reject all mean-zero risks given a particular initial wealth
w, it is necessary and sufficient for the utility curve u to lie entirely be-
low its tangent line at w. To guarantee that an agent will always want
less (in absolute value) of a mean-zero risk, it is necessary and sufficient
for marginal utility to be above u′(w) to the left of w and below u′(w) to
the right of w. Although either of these conditions requires that u′′(w) be
12
 w+x 
u(w+x) 
w 
u’(w) 
Figure 3: An example of a utility function u that is centrally risk-averse
around wealth level w, but is not concave. Concavity is necessary only
locally around w.
negative, and therefore u′(w) decreasing, in the neighborhood of w, they are
less demanding than global risk aversion.
Second, fixing the initial wealth w, central risk aversion implies central
diffidence but not vice versa. That is, central risk aversion is a stronger
property than central diffidence. This can be shown by integrating the
Necessary and Sufficient Condition (NSC) for central risk aversion:
Central Risk Aversion around w =⇒ Central Diffidence around w:
u(w + x)− u(w)− u′(w)x =
∫ x
0
[u′(ξ)− u′(w)]dξ ≤ 0. (24)
Geometrically, central diffidence around w requires that the utility func-
tion lie below its tangent line at w. Central risk aversion around w requires
that the the gap between the utility function and the tangent at w is always
increasing as one moves away from w. Clearly, the requirement that the gap
u(w)+u′(w)x−u(w+x) is increasing as one moves away from w is a stronger
condition than the requirement that the gap u(w) + u′(w)x − u(w + x) be
positive. Hence, central risk aversion is a stronger property than central
diffidence. Central risk aversion implies central diffidence, but central diffi-
dence does not imply central risk aversion.
13
3.1.2 Greater diffidence and greater risk aversion
For some applications globally greater risk aversion is more than is needed:
it is sometimes enough to know that an agent will act more risk averse from
a given starting wealth. This comes up, for example, in studying proper risk
aversion (Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1987) and standard risk aversion (Kimball,
1993). Proper risk aversion is when an undesirable independent background
risk always makes an agent reject more risks. Standard risk aversion is when
an independent background risk that raises expected marginal utility always
makes an agent reject more risks. The interesting thing about these prop-
erties is that an independent background risk being undesirable or raising
expected marginal utility can be true at some initial wealth levels and not
others. So, both proper risk aversion and standard risk aversion are saying
that a particular set of independent background risks will make the derived
utility function obtained by taking an expectation over the background risk
centrally more diffident around some values of starting wealth than the orig-
inal utility function with no background risk. This aspect of (Pratt and
Zeckhauser, 1987) and (Kimball, 1993) piqued our interest in central prop-
erties and played a key role in the historical origins of this paper.
By contrast, risk vulnerability (Gollier and Pratt, 1996) says that a
mean-zero independent background risk will make an agent reject more
risks. A mean-zero background risk is mean-zero regardless of the start-
ing wealth, so risk vulnerability implies that a mean-zero background risk
will make the derived utility function obtained by taking an expectation
over the background risk globally more diffident in the usual Arrow-Pratt
sense.
The logical relationships between central properties are different than
between global properties. In particular, globally greater diffidence and
globally greater risk aversion are the same thing and equivalent to the fa-
miliar Arrow-Pratt notion of globally greater risk aversion. By contrast, for
a given initial wealth centrally greater risk aversion implies centrally greater
diffidence but not vice versa. That is, centrally greater risk aversion is a
stronger property than centrally greater diffidence.
In accordance with the definitions of central diffidence and central risk
aversion above, define centrally greater diffidence and centrally greater risk
aversion as follows. Paralleling the definition of central diffidence itself, u2
centrally more diffident than u1 around the initial wealth w is defined by:
∀x˜ : Eu1(w + x˜) ≤ u1(w) =⇒ Eu2(w + x˜) ≤ u2(w). (25)
That is, agent 2 rejects w + x˜ in favor of w for more risks x˜ than agent 1
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does. Paralleling the definition of central risk aversion itself, u2 centrally
more risk averse than u1 around the initial wealth w is defined by:
∀x˜ : Ex˜u′1(w + x˜) ≤ 0 =⇒ Ex˜u′2(w + x˜) ≤ 0. (26)
Assuming concavity of both u1 and u2, the economic interpretation of cen-
trally greater risk aversion is that agent 2 would always choose an amount
α of the risk x˜ that is smaller in absolute value than agent 1. 4
Using the Diffidence Theorem, one can obtain the following necessary
and sufficient conditions for centrally greater diffidence and centrally greater
risk aversion. For centrally greater diffidence (assuming both u′1 and u′2 are
strictly positive) the central necessary and sufficient condition is:
∀x : u2(w + x)− u2(w)
u′2(w)
≤ u1(w + x)− u1(w)
u′1(w)
(27)
If one normalizes u1 and u2 so that u1(w) = u2(w) and u
′
1(w) = u
′
2(w),
centrally greater risk aversion means that the u2-curve is tangent to u1 at
w, but everywhere weakly below the u1-curve, as illustrated in Figure 4. For
centrally greater risk aversion, the central NSC is:
∀x : xu
′
2(w + x)
u′2(w)
≤ xu
′
1(w + x)
u′1(w)
(28)
With the normalization u′1(w) = u′2(w) (one component of the normalization
above), this is single crossing of marginal utility.
4Without the assumption of concavity, the techniques of monotone comparative statics
would still lead to a set of optimizing values of α for u2 that are smaller in absolute value
than the set of optimizing values of α for u1.
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 w+x 
u1(w+x) 
w 
u2(w+x) 
Figure 4: An example of a utility function u2 that is centrally more diffident
than u1 around wealth level w, but is not globally more concave than it.
Greater concavity is necessary only locally around w.
Given this characterization of the necessary and sufficient conditions for
centrally greater diffidence and centrally greater risk aversion, integration
of the NSC for centrally greater risk aversion yields the NSC for centrally
greater diffidence, showing that centrally greater risk aversion implies cen-
trally greater diffidence:
u2(w + x)− u2(w)
u′2(w)
− u1(w + x)− u1(w)
u′1(w)
=
∫ x
0
{[
u′2(w+ξ)
u′2(w)
]
−
[
u′1(w+ξ)
u′1(w)
]}
dξ
≤ 0 (29)
Here the sign consequences of the order of integration cancel out the sign of
[u′2(w+ ξ)/u′2(w)]− [u′1(w+ ξ)/u′1(w)]. The converse is false: [(u2(w+ x)−
u2(w))/u
′
2(w)]− [(u1(w+x)−u1(w))/u′1(w)] can be everywhere negative, as
required for greater central diffidence, without being everywhere increasing
to the left (when x ≤ 0) and everywhere decreasing to the right (when x ≥ 0)
as required for centrally greater risk aversion. Of course, being equal to zero
at x = 0 and everywhere below requires being increasing to the left of zero
in a neighborhood of x = 0 and increasing to the right in a neighborhood of
x = 0, so the local necessary conditions (NCs) for centrally greater diffidence
and centrally greater risk aversion are identical:
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 w+x 
u1(w+x) 
w 
u2(w+x) 
Figure 5: An example of a utility function u2 that is centrally more risk-
averse than u1 around wealth level w, but is not globally more concave than
u1. Greater concavity is necessary only locally around w.
u′′2(w)
u′2(w)
≤ u
′′
1(w)
u′1(w)
or
A2(w) ≥ A1(w) (30)
where Ai(w) = −u′′i (w)/u′i(w) is the index of absolute risk aversion of in-
dividual i. Thus, even though greater central risk aversion is a stronger
property, when restricted to a neighborhood of x = 0, it leads to the same
local property. From here on, we will refer to that local property as locally
greater risk aversion.
Locally greater risk aversion in the neighborhood of a particular initial
wealth w clearly does not imply centrally greater diffidence–let alone greater
central risk aversion–around that initial wealth. But if one requires locally
greater risk aversion to hold for all initial wealth levels w, it implies centrally
greater risk aversion for all initial wealth levels. Since
[ln(u′2(w+x))−ln(u′2(w))]−[ln(u′1(w+x))−ln(u′1(w))] =
∫ x
0
{[
u′′2(ξ)
u′2(ξ)
]
−
[
u′′1(ξ)
u′′1(ξ)
]}
dξ,
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the global Arrow-Pratt conditionA2(w) ≥ A1(w), or equivalently, u′′2(w)/u′2(w) ≤
u′′1(w)/u′2(w) implies
∀x ≥ 0 : [ln(u′2(w + x))− ln(u′2(w))]− [ln(u′1(w + x))− ln(u′1(w))] ≤ 0
∀x ≤ 0 : [ln(u′2(w + x))− ln(u′2(w))]− [ln(u′1(w + x))− ln(u′1(w))] ≥ 0.
This is equivalent to the condition for greater central risk aversion:
∀x ≥ 0 : u′2(w+x))u′2(w) ≤
u′1(w+x))
u′1(w)
∀x ≤ 0 : u′2(w+x))u′2(w) ≥
u′1(w+x))
u′1(w)
.
Let us summarize the results about locally greater risk aversion, cen-
trally greater diffidence, centrally greater risk aversion and globally greater
risk aversion. Think of locally greater risk aversion, centrally greater risk
aversion and centrally greater diffidence arranged in a triangle. For a partic-
ular initial wealth w, centrally greater risk aversion implies centrally greater
diffidence, which in turn implies locally greater risk aversion. But locally
greater risk aversion does not imply either centrally greater risk aversion or
centrally greater diffidence. And centrally greater diffidence does not imply
centrally greater risk aversion.
 
Centrally greater 
diffidence  
around w 
Centrally greater 
risk aversion  
around w 
Locally greater  
risk aversion  
around w 
Now, add the universal quantifier ”for all initial wealth levels w.” Locally
greater risk aversion in the neighborhood of all initial wealth levels w implies
centrally greater risk aversion around every initial wealth level w, which
implies centrally greater diffidence around every initial wealth level w, which
in turn implies greater local risk aversion in the neighborhood of every initial
wealth level w. Thus, all three are equivalent and can be given the same
name: ”globally greater risk aversion.”
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 Centrally greater 
diffidence  
for all w 
Centrally greater 
risk aversion 
for all w  
Locally greater  
risk aversion 
for all w  
The implications on two sides of the triangle work initial wealth level
by initial wealth level; but the implication from locally greater risk aver-
sion in the neighborhood of every initial wealth to centrally great risk aver-
sion around every initial wealth requires, in effect, stitching together locally
greater risk aversion at every initial wealth to get centrally greater risk aver-
sion around even one initial wealth level. Fortunately, the stitching together
of locally greater risk aversion conditions to get centrally greater risk aver-
sion around one initial wealth level works similarly to get centrally greater
risk aversion around any initial wealth level.
3.1.3 Prudence and central prudence
Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) define an atemporal concept of prudence
by considering two harms in the form of a sure loss ` and a zero-mean risk
x˜. A prudent individual ”prefers to receive one of the two harms for certain,
with the only uncertainty being about which one is received, as opposed to a
50-50 chance of receiving both harms simultaneously or receiving neither”.5
This is the case if the utility premium z(w) = Eu(w+x˜)−u(w) is increasing.
Thus, prudence can be defined as follows:
Ex˜ = 0 =⇒ Eu′(w + x˜) ≥ u′(w), (31)
for all x˜ and all w. It is centrally prudent at w if the above condition is
true for all x˜ for this specific w. Notice that, following Kimball (1990),
prudence can more traditionally be defined by requiring that consumers
reduce their current consumption when a zero-mean risk is added to future
income. Applying the same analysis as for risk aversion, we obtain the
5An earlier version of the same definition is provided by Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schnei-
der [1995].
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following two characterizations:
Prudence: u′ convex (32)
Central Prudence: ∀x : u′(w + x)− u′(w) ≥ u′′(w)x. (33)
Although central prudence requires that u′′′(w) be positive, it is less de-
manding than prudence.
Central prudence looks like diffidence, one derivative up. By analogy
to central risk aversion, one could also define ”scale-up prudence” by an
increase in the scale of a mean-zero risk raising expected marginal utility.
(Central risk aversion could have been called ”central scale-up diffidence.”)
The mathematical condition for central scale-up prudence is:
Central Scale-Up Prudence: xu′′(w + x) ≥ xu′′(w) (34)
That is, the second derivative of the utility function is algebraically higher
to the right of w and lower to the left of w than at w. If u′′(w + x) < 0,
that means u′′ is closer to zero to the right of w and further from zero to
the left of w. When they hold globally, prudence and scale-up prudence are
equivalent, but for a particular starting wealth w they are distinct concepts.
3.1.4 Greater prudence and centrally greater prudence
Under what mathematical condition on the two utility functions does any
risk that increases the precautionary saving (or utility premium) of agent u1
also increases the precautionary saving (or utility premium) of agent u2? In
the discounted expected utility model in which individual i selects the con-
sumption plan (w0, w) to maximize v(w0)+ui(w) under some intertemporal
budget constraint, this is true if and only if
∀w, x˜ : Eu′1(w + x˜) ≥ u′1(w) =⇒ Eu′2(w + x˜) ≥ u′2(w), (35)
where w can be interpreted as optimal future consumption in the absence of
risk. Depending upon whether w is arbitrary or fixed, this condition defines
the concept of greater prudence or centrally greater prudence. Define the
index of absolute prudence of agent i by Pi(w) = −u′′′i (w)/u′′i (w). Assuming
u′′1(w) < 0 and u′′2(w) < 0, these concepts can be characterized as follows:
Greater Prudence: ∀w : P2(w) ≥ P1(w) (36)
Centrally Greater Prudence: ∀x : u′2(w+x)−u′2(w)u′′2 (w) ≤
u′1(w+x)−u′1(w)
u′′1 (w)
. (37)
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By analogy to centrally greater risk aversion, centrally greater scale-up pru-
dence can be defined thus: if a small increase in the scale of a risk raises
expected marginal utility for u1, then that increase in scale also raises ex-
pected marginal utility for u2. The relationship between centrally greater
prudence and centrally greater scale-up prudence is analogous to the rela-
tionship between centrally greater diffidence and centrally greater risk aver-
sion. ssuming u′′1(w) < 0 and u′′2(w) < 0, the mathematical condition for
greater scale-up prudence is
Centrally Greater Scale-Up Prudence:∀x : xu
′′
2(w + x)
u′′2(w)
≤ xu
′′
1(w + x)
u′′1(w)
.
(38)
3.1.5 Decreasing absolute risk aversion
There are several ways to define the concept of decreasing absolute risk
aversion. One is that after a decrease in initial wealth an initially undesirable
risk always remains undesirable. Another way to define decreasing absolute
risk aversion is the condition that prudence is stronger than risk aversion,
i.e. that any undesirable risk on future income reduces current consumption:
∀w, x˜ : Eu1(w + x˜) ≤ u1(w) =⇒ Eu′1(w + x˜) ≥ u′1(w). (39)
This problem is equivalent to problem (25) by defining u2 = −u′1. The
same conclusion applies, with a necessary and sufficient condition that the
index of absolute risk aversion for −u′1 be larger than the index of absolute
risk aversion for u1, i.e. P1(w) ≥ A1(w) for all w. It is easily seen that
this is equivalent to decreasing absolute risk aversion of u1 since A
′
1(w) =
A1(w)[A1(w)− P1(w)] ≤ 0.
Central decreasing absolute risk aversion can be defined by requiring
that, given a particular starting point w next period, any undesirable risk
reduces current consumption–or alternatively, that beginning from starting
wealth w, a small decrease in wealth leaves any initially undesirable risk still
undesirable. The mathematical condition for central decreasing absolute risk
aversion is that −u′1 is centrally more diffident around w than u1.
Central scale-up decreasing absolute risk aversion can be defined by re-
quiring that, given a particular starting point w next period, any unde-
sirable increase in the scale of a risk also reduces current consumption–or
alternatively, that beginning from starting wealth w, any initially undesir-
able scaling-up of a risk remains undesirable after a small decrease in initial
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wealth. The mathematical condition for central scale-up decreasing absolute
risk aversion is that −u′1 must be centrally more risk averse around w than
u1.
Dionne and Ingabire (2001) extend these results to the case of state-
dependent expected utility. In particular, they establish formal necessary
and sufficient conditions in order to obtain prudence and decreasing absolute
risk aversion when the utility function is state-specific.
3.1.6 Decreasing absolute prudence
Suppose that adding risk x˜ to future income w does not affect current saving.
Following Kimball [1993], we say that the individual has decreasing absolute
prudence if an increase in w implies that adding risk x˜ to w induces the
individual to save less. Technically, this is true iff6
∀w, x˜ : Eu′1(w + x˜) = u′1(w) =⇒ Eu′′1(w + x˜) ≤ u′′1(w). (40)
From Proposition 1, this condition holds if and only if u′′1 is more concave
than −u′1. It is easy to verify that this condition is equivalent to P1 being
nonincreasing. One can also define central decreasing absolute prudence
and central scale-up decreasing absolute prudence by analogy to central
decreasing absolute risk aversion and central scale-up decreasing absolute
risk aversion. The respective mathematical conditions are u′′1 being centrally
more diffident than −u′1 around some initial level w for central decreasing
absolute prudence and u′′1 being centrally more risk averse than −u′1 around
some initial level w for central scale-up decreasing absolute prudence.
3.1.7 Temperance and central temperance
Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) also define an atemporal concept of tem-
perance by using the same preference for the apportionment of harms, when
the sure-loss harm is replaced by an independent zero-mean risk. Temper-
ance is then defined by the concavity of the utility premium function z1:
Ex˜ = 0 =⇒ Eu′′1(w + x˜) ≤ u′′1(w), (41)
for all x˜ and all w. A utility function is centrally temperate around w
if the above condition is true for all x˜ for this specific w. We leave the
6Gollier [1996] provides a simple interpretation of this condition which is based on how
a marketable risk should be shared when an agent in the pool bears another nonmarketable
risk.
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characterization of greater temperance, centrally greater temperance and
centrally greater scale-up temperance as an exercise for interested readers: it
looks like the characterization of globally greater prudence, centrally greater
prudence and centrally greater scale-up prudence, one more derivative up.
3.1.8 Effect of a new investment opportunity on consumption
Suppose that consumers have access to a new risky asset whose net payoff
will be delivered next period. Under what mathematical condition on the
utility function does this new investment opportunity increase consumption
and reduce saving today?7 Let x˜ denote this net payoff for one unit of this
asset, and suppose without loss of generality that the optimal investment
strategy is to purchase one unit of the asset. Then, this new investment
opportunity reduces saving if and only the following condition holds:
∀x˜ : Ex˜u′(w + x˜) = 0 =⇒ Eu′(w + x˜) ≤ u′(w), (42)
Applying the Diffidence Theorem with f1(x) = xu
′(w + x) and f2(x) =
u′(w + x) − u′(w) yields the following central necessary and sufficient con-
dition for any given initial wealth w:8
∀x : u′(w + x)− u′(w) ≤ u
′′(w)
u′(w)
xu′(w + x). (43)
The local necessary condition is equivalent to P (w) ≤ 2A(w). Observe that
this condition is equivalent to g(w) = 1/u′(w) being convex. It implies
that g(w + x) ≥ g(w) + xg′(w) for all w and x. This is equivalent to the
sufficient condition (43). This is therefore another example in which the
local condition holding at all wealth levels implies the global condition.
Suppose one confronted this problem, but did not immediately see that
the condition P (w) ≤ 2A(w) implied convexity of 1/u′(w). How should
one proceed? Many courses in differential equations do not cover differen-
tial inequalities, so let us illustrate how to approach a differential inequality
such as the local necessary condition here, assumed to hold for every start-
ing point w. The trick is to replace the differential inequality of the local
necessary condition with the corresponding differential equation, solve that
differential equation, then go back and see if the solution to the differential
7Selden and Wei (2018) answer this question in the more general framework of Kreps-
Porteus preferences.
8Another detailed discussion, referring to this paper, is available in Gollier (2001), pp
146 and Proposition 75.
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equation provides clues to the solution to the differential inequality. For this
case, the procedure looks like this: first, the differential equation counterpart
to the local necessary condition, which gives the borderline case, is
u′′′(w)
u′′(w
= 2
u′′(w)
u′(w)
.
Assuming u′(w) is always positive and u′′(w) is always negative, this has the
first integral
ln(−u′′(w)) = 2 ln(u′(w)) + constant,
or equivalently
−u′′(w)
[u′(w)]2
= constant.
This in turn can be integrated to
1
u′(w)
= a+ bx.
That is, the borderline case is when the reciprocal of marginal utility is
linear. To have decreasing marginal utility, b must be positive. There are
constraints on a as well in order to keep marginal utility positive. Now,
use the algebra for the differential equation case as a clue for solving the
differential inequality. To keep signs straight, differential inequalities need
to be solved by restatement with a combination of integration and differen-
tiation, rather integrating as one would do for a differential equation. The
differential inequality P (w) ≤ 2A(w) can be written without the minus signs
as
u′′′(w)
u′′(w
) ≥ 2u
′′(w)
u′(w)
This differential inequality is equivalent to
d
dw
ln(−u′′(w)) ≥ 2 d
dw
ln(u′(w))
or
d
dw
ln
(−u′′(w)
[u′(w)]2
)
≥ 0.
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Because the natural logarithm is a monotonically increasing function, this
in turn implies
d
dw
(−u′′(w)
[u′(w)]2
)
≥ 0.
Finally, that condition is equivalent to
d2
dw2
(
1
u′(w)
)
≥ 0.
This is the condition of convexity of the reciprocal of marginal utility stated
above.
For this problem, after “integrating” the differential inequality in this
reinterpretive sense, the final step in checking whether the local NC holding
true for all initial wealths is enough to guarantee the central NSC for any
initial wealth is to rearrange the central NSC to show it is equivalent to the
reciprocal of marginal utility being above the tangent lines to the reciprocal
of marginal utility. That is, once one knows that the local necessary condi-
tion implies convexity of 1/u′(w), one can check whether any of the salient
properties of convex functions help in establishing the truth of the central
NSC.
One nice thing about this problem is that one can switch directions, and
all the steps go through, with only a change in the direction of some of the
inequalities. That is, if one asks ”Under what condition does this new in-
vestment opportunity reduce consumption and increases saving today?” the
answer is that guaranteeing this for any starting wealth and any risk pat-
tern for the new investment opportunity requires that 1/u′(w) be concave.
Demonstrating this is an excellent exercise for understanding the technique
here.
It is possible for neither of these two conditions to hold: the reciprocal of
marginal utility can be convex in some intervals and concave in others. But
if one of them does hold globally, which is more likely? Consider constant-
relative-risk-aversion utility functions with the functional form
u(w) =
w1−γ − 1
1− γ ,
which limit into ln(w) for γ = 1. Marginal utility is u′(w) = w−γ and the
reciprocal of marginal utility is
1
u′(w)
= wγ .
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This is convex if γ > 1, concave if γ < 1, and linear in the log-utility case
γ = 1. The value of γ is controversial, so not everyone will agree, but based
on the equity premium puzzle, γ > 1 seems likely. Thus, assuming constant
relatively risk aversion, it seems more likely that opening a new asset market
will raise consumption and reduce saving. In terms of the inequality P ≤ 2A,
in the special case of constant relative risk aversion γ, we have A(w) = γ/w
and P (w) = (γ + 1)/w. This implies that P ≤ 2A if and only if γ ≥ 1.
To reprise the result:
Proposition 2 Opening up a new asset market delivering a net payoff in the
future raises (reduces) current consumption if and only if absolute prudence
is smaller (larger) than twice absolute risk aversion.
The condition that prudence is smaller (larger) than twice risk aversion
is equivalent to the condition that risk tolerance 1/A has a derivative that
is smaller (larger) than one. These conditions are useful in many other
comparative statics problems such as the impact of heterogeneous beliefs
(Gollier (2007)) on asset prices. The fact that a logarithmic agent would
not change current consumption when a new asset market with independent
returns is opened is another illustration of the myopia of logarithmic agents
(see for example Mossin (1968)).
3.1.9 Effect of a new investment opportunity on the attitude to-
ward another small risk
Would opening up a new asset market induce risk-averse investors to reject
a lottery that they would have accepted otherwise? Here we solve this
problem for the case of small lotteries. In other words, we determine whether
opening up a new market increases local risk aversion. If x˜ denotes the
optimal exposure to the new risky investment opportunity at wealth level
w, undertaking x˜ modifies the attitude towards other independent risks. In
the small, this change in attitude is described by the change from the local
concavity at w of the original utility function u to the local concavity at w
of the indirect utility function given by v(z) = Eu(z+ x˜). The problem can
thus be written as follows:
∀x˜ : Ex˜u′(w + x˜) = 0 =⇒ −Eu
′′(w + x˜)
Eu′(w + x˜)
≥ −u
′′(w)
u′(w)
, (44)
After clearing fractions, applying the Diffidence Theorem yields the following
condition:
∀x : A(w + x) ≥ A(w) + xA′(w). (45)
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The local necessary condition is A′′(w) ≥ 0. If we require that the individ-
ual becomes locally more risk-averse when a new investment opportunity
appears, regardless of initial wealth level, then this local condition must
hold for all w, i.e., absolute risk aversion must be convex. But this con-
dition is obviously equivalent to Condition (45). This proves the following
proposition, which is also in Gollier (2001, Proposition 33), referring to this
paper.
Proposition 3 A new investment opportunity raises local risk aversion if
and only if absolute risk aversion is convex.
The index of absolute risk aversion of all familiar utility functions is
convex. In fact, all familiar utility functions have harmonic risk aversion,
i.e., a linear risk tolerance.
3.2 Applications with no univariate necessary and sufficient
condition
In this section, we present more difficult applications of the Diffidence The-
orem in which the sufficient conditions in the small are not sufficient in the
large.
3.2.1 Effect of a unfair background risk on the equilibrium risk
free rate
Consider a simple Lucas tree model with two consumption dates. The crop
from the tree is c0 at date 0, and w at date 1. The representative agent
selects saving s in order to maximize her discounted expected utility:
maxs v(c0 − s) + ui (w + ers) , (46)
where r is the interest rate on savings. At equilibrium, assuming that ui
is concave, we must have s = 0, which yields the following classical pricing
equation:
eri =
v′(c0)
u′i(w)
. (47)
Suppose now that an unfair risk x˜ (i.e. Ex˜ ≤ 0) is added to the fruit crop.
It is easy to check that this reduces the equilibrium rate by ∆i, with
∆i = log
(
Eu′i(w + x˜)
u′i(w)
)
. (48)
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∆i is usually referred to as the precautionary term, as it measures the down-
ward sensitivity of the equilibrium interest rate to future risk. Under risk
aversion and prudence, this precautionary term is positive. It plays an im-
portant role in the debate on the climate discount rate (Weitzman, 2007;
Gollier, 2016), and in solving the risk-free rate puzzle. We are interested
in characterizing the role of preferences on the size of this precautionary
term. We compare two economies, i = 1, 2, that differ in the risk attitudes
given by ui. The effect of risk x˜ on the equilibrium interest rate is larger in
economy 2 than in economy 1 iff
∀x˜ : Ex˜ ≤ 0 =⇒ Eu
′
2(w + x˜)
u′2(w)
≥ Eu
′
1(w + x˜)
u′1(w)
, (49)
Thus, our problem simplifies to determining when does an unfair risk raise
expected marginal utility by a bigger percentage for one utility function
than another. Clearing fractions and then applying the Diffidence Theorem
yields the following central NSC:
∀x : u
′
1(w + x)
u′1(w)
− u
′
2(w + x)
u′2(w)
≤ x
[
u′′1(w)
u′1(w)
− u
′′
2(w)
u′2(w)
.
]
(50)
The two local necessary conditions are
A2(w) ≥ A1(w) (51)
A2(w)P2(w) ≥ A1(w)P1(w). (52)
Ai(w)Pi(w) = u
′′′
i (w)/u
′
i(w) is often referred to as the coefficient of downside
risk aversion.9
This application of the Diffidence Theorem is our first example for which
the local diffidence condition being true for all w does not provide a global
sufficient condition. That is, imposing Conditions (51) and (52) for all w
does not imply condition (50), which is what is needed to guarantee the
comparative statics property (49) of interest.
But we hereafter show that the more restrictive condition A2 ≥ A1 and
P2 ≥ P1 ≥ 0 is sufficient. Let ψi denote the precautionary premium of risk
x˜ for individual i, i.e., Eu′i(w + x˜) = u′i(w − ψi). Because of prudence, we
know that ψi is positive. Because P2 is larger than P1, we also know that
ψ2 is larger than ψ1. We then find that
Eu′2(w + x˜)
u′2(w)
=
u′2(w − ψ2)
u′2(w)
≥ u
′
1(w − ψ2)
u′1(w)
≥ u
′
1(w − ψ1)
u′1(w)
=
Eu′1(w + x˜)
u′1(w)
.
(53)
9Keenan and Snow (2010) discuss the different possible indices of downside risk aversion
and their link to risk aversion and prudence.
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The first inequality comes from ψ2 ≥ 0 and A2 ≥ A1. Indeed, this last
condition implies that u′2(w − x)/u′2(w) is larger than u′1(w − x)/u′1(w) for
all positive x. The second inequality in (53) comes from the fact that ψ2
is larger than ψ1 and u1 is concave. This demonstrates the sufficiency of
condition (i) of the following proposition. the proof of the sufficiency of part
(ii) is relegated to the Appendix.10
Proposition 4 Introducing an unfair idiosyncratic risk to consumption growth
has a larger effect on the equilibrium risk-free rate in the economy with util-
ity function u2 than in the economy with utility function u1 only if A2 ≥ A1
and A2P2 ≥ A1P1. The following two conditions are each sufficient:
(i) A2 ≥ A1 and P2 ≥ P1 ≥ 0;
(ii) u′′2 − u
′
2
u′1
u′′1 is increasing.
Using the Diffidence Theorem, Gollier (2015) addressed the associated
question of the impact of wealth inequality on the equilibrium interest rate.
In particular, he shows that the wealth inequality increases the interest rate
if relative risk aversion is decreasing and convex.
3.2.2 Acceptance of a portfolio
Consider again the one-safe-one-risky-asset portfolio problem. Is the port-
folio selected by individual 1 desirable for individual 2, when individual 2
only has a binary choice between that portfolio and the fully risk-free op-
tion? This problem might be encountered by a fund manager or a life insurer
who wishes to select a portfolio that maximizes the welfare of the modal cus-
tomer, while at the same time keeping more risk-averse individuals invested
in the fund. Individual 2 finds individual 1’s optimal quantity of the risky
asset acceptable compared to none iff:
∀x˜ : Ex˜u′1(w + x˜) = 0 =⇒ Eu2(w + x˜) ≥ u2(w), (54)
Applying the Diffidence Theorem yields the following central NSC:
∀x : u2(w + x)− u2(w) ≥ u
′
2(w)
u′1(w)
xu′1(w + x) (55)
The local necessary condition that bites is:
A2(w) ≤ 2A1(w). (56)
10The results presented in Proposition 4 have not been published elsewhere.
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We obtain the following Proposition.
Proposition 5 A necessary condition for u2 to like the optimal portfolio of
u1 is A2 ≤ 2A1. A sufficient condition is A2 ≤ P1 ≤ 2A1.
Proof: Sufficiency of A2 ≤ P1 ≤ 2A1 comes from the fact that the second
inequality implies [Ex˜u′1(w + x˜) = 0 =⇒ Eu′1(w + x˜) ≤ u′1(w)], while the
first inequality implies that [Eu′1(w+ x˜) ≤ u′1(w) =⇒ Eu1(w+ x˜) ≥ u1(w)].
Remark: Recall that P1 ≤ 2A1 is satisfied for CRRA if γ > 1. Also recall
that P = γ+1 for CRRA. Hence, if the modal investor has constant relative
risk aversion larger than 1, the amount of the risky asset chosen to optimize
for the modal customer is guaranteed to be acceptable to others who have
constant relative risk aversion γ2 with γ2 ≤ γ1 + 1.
Symmetrically, agent u2 always dislikes the optimal portfolio of agent u1
only if A2 ≥ 2A1. A sufficient condition is A2 ≥ P1 ≥ 2A1.
3.2.3 Risk vulnerability
Gollier and Pratt (1996) defined the concept of ”risk vulnerability” as fol-
lows: u1 is vulnerable to risk if adding an unfair background risk to wealth
raises the aversion to any other independent risk, namely:
∀x˜ : Ex˜ ≤ 0 =⇒ −Eu
′′
1(w + x˜)
Eu′1(w + x˜)
≥ −u
′′
1(w)
u′1(w)
, (57)
Equivalently, assuming u′′(w) < 0,
∀x˜ : Ex˜ ≤ 0 =⇒ Eu
′′
1(w + x˜)
u′′1(w)
≥ Eu
′
1(w + x˜)
u′1(w)
, (58)
Let Ti(w) = −u′′′′i (w)/u′′′i (w) denote the index of absolute temperance as
defined in Gollier and Pratt (1996). When comparing problem (58) to prob-
lem (49), we see that risk vulnerability is an application of problem (49) by
defining u2 ≡ −u′1. Therefore, after some algebra, the central NSC is:
u′1(w + x) [A1(w + x)−A1(w)] ≥ xu′1(w)A′1(w), (59)
the necessary conditions P1 ≥ A1 and T1 ≥ A1, together with the sufficient
condition T1 ≥ P1 ≥ A1 obtained by Gollier and Pratt (1996) are directly
obtained from Conditions (50), (51), (52) and (P2 ≥ P1, A2 ≥ A1).
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The role of background risk in optimal risk management has been exten-
sively studied over the last two decades by using the Diffidence Theorem.
For example, Crainich, Eeckhoudt and Le Courtois (2016) extend the anal-
ysis to the case of bivariate utility functions. Making the second argument
y (health, for example) of the utility function risky lowers the propensity to
take financial risk only if the intensity of cross prudence defined by uxyy/ux
decreases with wealth x.11 Franke, Schlesinger and Stapleton (2011) charac-
terize the concept corresponding to risk vulnerability when the background
risk is multiplicative. Hara, Huang and Kuzmics (2011) characterize the
impact of an independent additive background risk on the demand for port-
folio insurance. Franke, Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1998) characterize
the impact of background risk on the demand for portfolio insurance when
absolute risk tolerance is linear in wealth within a general equilibrium frame-
work. Eichner [2008], Jiang, Ma and An (2010) and Eichner and Wagener
(2012) examine the optimal composition of the assets portfolio in the pres-
ence of background risk in the mean-variance context. Testlin and Winkler
(2005) are the first to generalize the concept of risk vulnerability to the case
of correlated background risks. Arrondel, Calvo-Pardo and Oliver (2010)
estimate the degree of risk vulnerability and temperance by using French
cross-sectional data on earnings and portfolio choices. Finally, Gollier and
Schlesinger (2002) discuss the implications of background risk and risk vul-
nerability for the equity premium.
3.2.4 Semi properness
Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987) introduce the notion of properness, which guar-
antees that adding any undesirable background risk to wealth makes the
agent more averse to any other independent risk. In this subsection, we
introduce the notion of semi-properness. Utility function u is semi-proper
if adding any undesirable background risk to wealth makes the agent more
averse to any other small independent risk. This means that the indirect
utility function v(w) = Eu(w + x˜) is locally more concave than u at all
wealth levels at which x˜ is undesirable:
∀x˜ : Eu(w + x˜) ≤ u(w) =⇒ −Eu
′′(w + x˜)
Eu′(w + x˜)
≥ −u
′′(w)
u′(w)
, (60)
As it is apparent, semi properness is a weaker restriction than properness.
Indeed, semi properness means that indirect utility function v is required
11For more on cross-prudence, see Eeckhoudt, Rey and Schlesinger (2007).
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to be locally more risk-averse than u at w. This is weaker than properness,
which requires that v be centrally more diffident than u at w, a condition
that is stronger than locally greater risk aversion as shown in subsection
3.1.2.
However, semi-properness is a stronger restriction than risk vulnerabil-
ity. This is apparent from the fact that the same condition Av(w) ≥ A1(w)
is required to hold for a larger set of random variables under semi proper-
ness than under risk vulnerability. Indeed, under risk aversion, the set of
undesirable lotteries contains the set of non-positive-mean lotteries as a sub-
set.
Clearing fraction and then using the Diffidence Theorem, the necessary
and sufficient condition for semi properness can be written as follows:
∀x : A(w + x)−A(w)
A′(w)
≤ u(w + x)− u(w)
u′(w + x)
(61)
The local necessary conditions are A′(w) ≤ 0 and A′′(w) ≥ A′(w)A(w).
These conditions, even when imposed for all wealth levels w, are not suf-
ficient for (61). But suppose that A′ ≤ 0 and that −A is more concave
than u, i.e., that −A′′/A′ is uniformly larger than A. Using our findings in
subsection 3.1.2, this implies the first inequality below:
A(w + x)−A(w)
A′(w)
≤ u(w + x)− u(w)
u′(w)
≤ u(w + x)− u(w)
u′(w + x)
,
for all x. The second inequality is a consequence of the concavity of u. This
yields the sufficient condition (61) and thereby demonstrates the following
proposition.
Proposition 6 Adding an undesirable risk to wealth raises the aversion to
any other small risk only if A′ ≤ 0 and A′′ ≥ A′A. A sufficient condition is
A′ ≤ 0 and A′′ ≥ −A′A.
Remark: For CRRA, −A(w) = −γ/w, so −A′′(w)/A′(w) = 2/w. This
means that for the CRRA case, the sufficient condition in the proposition
above applies when relative risk aversion is ≤ 2.
Rather than examining the impact of the introduction of risk on the at-
titude towards other independent risks, Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger
(1996) and Keenan, Rudow and Snow (2008) explore the impact of an
nth-degree stochastic deterioration of a background risk. Lajeri-Chaherli
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(2002) examine properness in the mean-variance framework. Lajeri-Chaherli
showed that quasi-concavity plus decreasing risk aversion is equivalent to
proper risk aversion in that context. In Lajeri-Chaherli (2004), they extend
these ideas to two-moment decision models. Munier and Tapiero (2008) ex-
plore the generalization of properness and similar concepts to non-expected-
utility models.
4 The Bivariate Diffidence Theorem
Other problems involving multiple risks require a modification of the tech-
niques of the Diffidence Theorem. Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987) define proper
risk aversion by requiring that any undesirable risk can never be made de-
sirable by adding another independent undesirable risk to wealth.12 Math-
ematically, (fixed-wealth) properness is defined by the following property:
∀w, x˜, y˜ :
Eu(w+ x˜) ≤ u(w) and Eu(w+ y˜) ≤ u(w) =⇒ Eu(w+ y˜+ x˜) ≤ Eu(w+ x˜),
(62)
where x˜ and y˜ are independent random variables. There is a simple way
to solve this problem by using the Diffidence Theorem twice. Indeed, by
definition, u1 is proper if and only if v(w) = Eu(w + x˜) is centrally more
risk-averse than u for any undesirable risk x˜ at w, and for any w. Thus, an
equivalent definition of properness is: ∀w, y, x˜ : Eu(w + x˜) ≤ u(w) implies
Eu(w + y + x˜)− Eu(w + x˜)
Eu′(w + x˜)
≤ u(w + y)− u(w)
u′(w)
. (63)
Applying the Diffidence Theorem again for every y yields the necessary and
sufficient condition obtained by Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987, Theorem 4).
Taking inspiration from this example, let us state and prove the Bivariate
Diffidence Theorem. The general structure of the problem that can be solved
by the Bivariate Diffidence Theorem is as follows:13
∀x˜, y˜ : Ef1(x˜) = f1(0) and Ef2(y˜) = f2(0) =⇒ Eh(x˜, y˜) ≤ 0. (64)
12More recently, the bivariate Diffidence Theorem has been used by Crainich, Eeckhoudt
and Le Courtois (2014) to link risk vulnerability to decreasing downside risk aversion.
13To be concise, we limit the analysis to nonstochastic initial w, and equality conditions.
Other formulations can easily be characterized by following the same rules as above.
33
In the following bivariate Diffidence Theorem, we systematize the technique
that has been presented above to characterize properness.
Theorem 2 Suppose that function h(x, y) satisfies h(x, 0) ≡ 0 and h(0, y) ≡
0. Then, as long as f ′1(0) 6= 0 and f ′2(0) 6= 0, Condition (64) is equivalent
to the condition that
h(x, y)− δ1(x)∂h
∂x
(0, y)− δ2(y)∂h
∂y
(x, 0) + δ1(x)δ2(y)
∂2h
∂x∂y
(0, 0) ≤ 0, (65)
for all x and y, with δi(x) = (fi(x)− fi(0))/f ′i(0).
Proof: Given the assumptions, for any y˜ satisfying the second condition
in (64), any x˜ satisfying the first condition in (64) implies Eh(x˜, y˜) ≤ 0.
Consider any random variable y˜ such that Ef2(y˜) = f2(0). Then, for this
y˜, condition (64) is equivalent to the generic diffidence property (1). Then,
the univariate Diffidence Theorem can be applied. It yields the following
necessary and sufficient condition: For all x,
Ey
[
h(x, y˜)− δ1(x)∂h
∂x
(0, y˜)
]
≤ 0, (66)
with δ1(x) = (f1(x)− f1(0))/f ′1(0). This condition must hold for all y˜ such
that Ef2(y˜) = f2(0). The univariate Diffidence Theorem can be applied
again to obtain (65) as a necessary and sufficient condition for (64).
Note: h(x, y) satisfying h(x, 0) ≡ 0 and h(0, y) ≡ 0 is equivalent to:
h(x, y) = j(x, y)− j(x, 0)− j(0, y) + j(0, 0)
for some function j(x, y). It is clear that for any j this gives an h with the
stipulated property. On the other hand, if one has h in hand, it is easy to
find a j – just take h itself as j.
There are many other applications of the bivariate diffidence theorem.
For example, if the first condition in (62) is replaced by Eu′(w+ x˜) ≥ u′(w),
we get the notion of standard risk aversion introduced by Kimball (1993).
If it is replaced by condition Ex˜ ≤ 0, we get risk vulnerability. It would also
be easy to apply the Theorem to the following problem: ∀w, x˜, y˜ :
Ex˜u′1(w+ x˜) = 0 and Eu1(w+ y˜) = u1(w)⇒ Eu1(w+ y˜+ x˜) ≤ Eu1(w+ x˜).
(67)
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This is the problem of guaranteeing that opening up a new asset market
makes undesirable any risk for which one was indifferent prior to the opening.
Obviously, this condition is stronger than (44). This is left as an exercise
for interested readers. Many other examples can be found by combining
different types of functions fi that we considered in the previous section.
5 Other extensions
5.1 Allowing for an arbitrary reference situation
All applications of the Diffidence Theorem above rely on a pre-specified ini-
tial wealth level w. But one can imagine applications in which the initial
distribution of wealth is not specified. What would happen to the charac-
terization of the problem if the distribution of initial wealth ω˜ is stochastic
and arbitrary? In other words, what are the restrictions on functions f1, f2
to get
∀x˜, ω˜ : Ef1(x˜) ≤ Ef1(ω˜) =⇒ Ef2(x˜) ≤ Ef2(ω˜), (68)
To illustrate, if these functions are utility functions, under what conditions
on preferences is it true that if agent u1 prefers a lottery to another, then
agent u2 also prefers the former to the latter? We know the answer to this
simple problem: the two functions must represent the same preferences, i.e.
∃m > 0 : f2(.) ≡ mf1(.) + b. We generalize this result in the following
Proposition, which can be easily demonstrated using the Diffidence Theo-
rem.
Proposition 7 Condition (68) holds if and only if there exists a positive
scalar m such that f2(x)− f2(0) = m[f1(x)− f1(0)].
5.2 The Multi-Antecedent Diffidence Theorem
Another possible extension is to consider more than one condition on x˜.
Namely, consider an index set Θ ⊂ R that can be either finite or infinite,
and a set of functions {fθ(x), θ ∈ Θ}. The multi-antecedent problem is
written as:
∀x˜ : Efθ(x˜) ≤ Efθ(ω˜θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ =⇒ Eg(x˜) ≤ Eg(ω˜), (69)
where {ω˜θ|θ ∈ Θ} is a prespecified set of random variables. The multi-
antecedent Diffidence Theorem provides a tool to solve this kind of problem.
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Theorem 3 Suppose that functions fθ and g are in L2[a, b]. Then Condi-
tion (69) holds if and only if there exists a nonnegative Lebesgues-integrable
function m : Θ→ R such that
g(x)− Eg(ω˜) ≤
∫
Θ
m(θ)[fθ(x)− Efθ(ω˜θ)]dθ, (70)
for all x in [a, b].
Proof: See the Appendix.
Notice that multiplying the right-hand-side of Condition (70) by an ad-
ditional nonnegative scalar does not change the substance of the condition.
Thus, condition (69) is equivalent to the property
∀x˜ : E
∫
Θ
m(θ)fθ(x˜)dθ ≤ E
∫
Θ
m(θ)fθ(ω˜)dθ =⇒ Eg(x˜) ≤ Eg(ω˜). (71)
This means that any problem with more than one antecedent is equivalent
to another problem with only one antecedent on which the single-antecedent
Diffidence Theorem can be applied. To illustrate, consider the problem of
an agent v rejecting any lottery that both agents u1 and u2 reject:
∀x˜ : Eui(w + x˜) ≤ ui(w), i = 1, 2 =⇒ Ev(w + x˜) ≤ v(w). (72)
From our results, this is possible only if there exists two nonnegative scalars
m1,m2 such that v is centrally more risk-averse around w than u3 = m1u1 +
m2u2.
5.3 The Multi-Antecedent Multi-Reference Diffidence The-
orem
Of course, one can easily combine the two previous results to analyze prob-
lems with more than one antecedent and with an arbitrary reference point:
∀x˜, ω˜ : Efθ(x˜) ≤ Efθ(ω˜θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ =⇒ Eg(x˜) ≤ Eg(ω˜). (73)
This is possible only if there exists a nonnegative function m : Θ→ R such
that
g(x) =
∫
Θ
m(θ)fθ(x)dθ. (74)
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Jewitt (1987) obtains this condition. He applied it to the Ross’ concept
of ”strongly greater risk aversion” (Ross, 1981). A simpler illustration is
to determine under what condition agent v dislikes any change in risk that
agents both u1 and u2 dislike. From the discussion above, this is possible if
and only if v is a convex combination of u1 and u2. More generally, if an
agent v dislikes any change in risk that any agent with constant absolute
risk aversion dislikes, it must be the case that v is completely monotone, i.e.
all odd derivatives of v must be positive and all even derivatives of v must
be negative: v(w) = − ∫+∞0 m(θ)e−θwdθ.
6 Concluding remarks
Under what condition on (f1, f2) do we have the property that Ef2(w, x˜) ≤
f2(w, 0) for all lotteries x˜ for which Ef1(w, x˜) = f1(w, 0)? The Diffidence
Theorem points to three different conditions associated to this problem. The
simplest one consists in a necessary condition that is in fact necessary and
sufficient ”in the small”, i.e., when we limit the set of random variables
to small risks. This necessary condition states that f2(w, x) must be more
concave with respect to x in the sense of Arrow-Pratt than f1(w, x), locally in
the neighborhood of (w, 0). This local condition is generally straightforward
to characterize by standard univariate calculus.
The second condition is called a ”central” condition, and is necessary
and sufficient for the property above to hold for all x˜, but for a fixed, given
w. Finally, the ”global” condition requires that the property holds for all w.
The Diffidence Theorem fully characterizes the central and global conditions,
the latter requiring that a bivariate function be nonpositive. Of course, the
global condition implies the central condition, which in turn implies the local
one, but the reverse is not true in general. However, there are circumstances,
such as when functions f1 and f2 are additive in (w, x), in which the local
condition implies the global one. But in many applications, such as those
associated to the concepts of properness and risk vulnerability, the condition
”in the small” is not equivalent to the condition ”in the large”. This paper
describes these local necessary conditions, central necessary and sufficient
conditions and global sufficient conditions, and discusses their links in the
context of a wide variety of applied problems. One key unresolved question
is: What general principle determines when the local condition holding for
all initial w implies the global condition?
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 4 (sufficiency of condition (ii))
The two necessary conditions are simple rewritings of conditions (51)
and (52). The sufficiency of u′′2(w) − u
′
2(w)
u′1(w)
u′′1(w) increasing is obtained in
the following way. Take any positive scalar ξ. The above condition means
that
u′′2(w + ξ)−
u′2(w + ξ)
u′1(w + ξ)
u′′1(w + ξ)− u′′2(w) +
u′2(w)
u′1(w)
u′′1(w) ≥ 0. (75)
Dividing by u′2(w) and integrating the corresponding condition on [0, x],
x > 0, yields
∫ x
0
u′′2(w + ξ)
u′2(w)
− u
′′
1(w + ξ)
u′1(w)
u′2(w+ξ)
u′2(w)
u′1(w+ξ)
u′1(w)
dξ ≥ x
[
u′′2(w)
u′2(w)
− u
′′
1(w)
u′1(w)
]
.
The same inequality holds for x < 0 since the change of the direction of
inequality (75) is compensated by the direction of the integration. So, for
any x, we obtain∫ x
0
u′′2(w + ξ)
u′2(w)
− u
′′
1(w + ξ)
u′1(w)
dξ + g(x) ≥ x
[
u′′2(w)
u′2(w)
− u
′′
1(w)
u′1(w)
]
,
or, equivalently,[
u′2(w + x)
u′2(w)
− u
′
1(w + x)
u′1(w)
]
+ g(x) ≥ x
[
u′′2(w)
u′2(w)
− u
′′
1(w)
u′1(w)
]
, (76)
where
g(x) =
∫ x
0
u′′1(w + ξ)
u′1(w)
 u
′
1(w+ξ)
u′1(w)
− u′2(w+ξ)u′2(w)
u′1(w+ξ)
u′1(w)
 dξ.
Because u2 is more risk-averse than u1, u2 is centrally more risk-averse than
u1 around w. It implies that the bracketed term in the integrant of g has
the same sign as x. It implies that g(x) is always negative. Combining this
fact with condition (76) yields the sufficient condition (50).
Proof of Theorem 3
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Consider the set of Lebesgue-integrable real functions in L2[a, b], with
the associated product scalar < f, g >=
∫
fg. If h is a density function for
x˜, then, < f, h > represents Ef(x˜). Consider any subset D ⊂ L2[a, b] and
define :
• Dˆ = {G ∈ L2|∀h ∈ L2 : < G, h >≤ 0 whenever < F, h >≤ 0 ∀f ∈
D}
• C(D) = the smallest closed convex cone containing D.
To prove Theorem 3, we need first to prove the following Lemma, which is
also used by Jewitt (1987).
Lemma : Dˆ = C(D)
Proof: The fact that C(D) ⊂ Dˆ is obvious. Let us then prove Dˆ ⊂ C(D).
By contradiction, suppose that ∃G¯ ∈ Dˆ, but G¯ /∈ C(D). Since C(D) is
convex, one may apply a separation theorem : ∃m ∈ L2[a, b] : < G¯,m >≥ 0
and < F,m >≤ 0 ∀F ∈ C(D). It implies that G¯ /∈ Dˆ, a contradiction.
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 3. Take D = {Fθ = fθ −
Efθ(ω˜θ)|θ ∈ Θ} ∪D−, with D− = {k|k(x) ≤ 0 ∀x}, the set of non positive
functions. Thus,
Dˆ = {G|∀h ∈ L2 : < G, h >≤ 0 whenever
< Fθ, h >≤ 0 ∀θ ∈ Θ and < k, h >≤ 0 ∀k ∈ D−}
We introduced the set of conditions < k, h >≤ 0 ∀k ∈ D− to ensure that h
may be interpreted as a density function. Thus, one can interpret Dˆ as
Dˆ = {G|EG(x˜) ≤ 0 whenever EFθ(x˜) ≤ 0 ∀θ ∈ Θ}
Applying the lemma yields that G ∈ Dˆ if and only if there exist a function
k ∈ D− and a nonnegative function m, such that
G(x) ≤
∫
Θ
m(θ)Fθ(x)dθ + k(x)
for all x. Define G = g − Eg(ω˜). The above condition is thus equivalent to
g(x)− Eg(ω˜) ≤
∫
Θ
m(θ)[fθ(x)− Efθ(ω˜θ)]dθ + k(x)
for all x. This is equivalent to (70), since k(x) ≤ 0.
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